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PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
ARTICLE
GENOCIDE: THE NAMIBIAN CASE
AGAINST GERMANY
Lynn Beratt
INTRODUCTION
When Namibia became independent in 1990, after more
than a century of colonial rule' - first by Germany and then by
South Africa - it joined the wave of democratizations sweeping
the globe.2 While the new government urged a spirit of reconcili-
ation upon the populace3 especially with regard to the country's
South African neighbors, many Namibians could not forget the
suffering inflicted upon them and their ancestors by the former
colonizers. This brought to the fore the question, shared by
many in new democracies, of how to treat human rights viola-
t Lynn Berat, B.A. New York University 1980; J.D. University of Texas 1983; Ph.D.
in African Legal History, Yale University 1988. Member of the Texas Bar. In 1988, Dr.
Berat joined the Ford Foundation as a Consultant on South African and Namibian
Projects for the Foundation's Developing Countries Program.
1. The process leading to Namibian independence is described in Lynn Berat and
Yossi Shain, Provisional Governments in Democratization: The 'International Interim
Government' Model and the Case of Namibia, 29 COEXISTENCE 19 (1992); LYNN BERAT,
WALVIS BAY: DECOLONIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990).
2. Democratic regime change is discussed in Lynn Berat and Yossi Shian, supra
note 1; Lynn Berat and Yossi Shain, Interim Governments in Democratic Transition:
Lessons from Namibia, Hope for South Africa?, 11 CONFLICT 17 (1991); SAMUEL HUNT-
INGTON. THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
3. See, e.g., AFRICA WATCH, ACCOUNTABILITY IN NAMIBIA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1992).
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tions committed by members of predecessor regimes.4 Although,
in practice, new regimes often choose not to prosecute for rea-
sons of political expedience, there is substantial authority that
new democracies have a duty under international law to bring
the guilty to justice. If the Namibian government decides to
abide by that duty, it will, no doubt, proceed against Germany,
under whose rule thousands perished through policies eerily red-
olent of those used by Germany during World War II.
This article establishes that Namibia has a claim of geno-
cide against Germany. Part I examines the details of German
colonial rule. Part II resolves questions of standing and state
succession which must be overcome if Namibia is to proceed.
Part III establishes a cause of action for genocide and addresses
the problem of retroactivity. Part IV suggests that the proper
measure of redress is reparations, achieved preferably via an
agreement between the two states.
I. THE COLONIAL LEGACY
A. The Struggle for South West Africa
Little archaeological work has been done in southwestern
Africa. Nevertheless, archaeologists have found evidence of
human occupation in various parts of what is today Namibia
dating to more than ten thousand years ago.6 Portuguese marin-
ers began to put an end to the isolation of the region from the
rest of the world in the fifteenth century. Prince Henry the Nav-
igator sent a series of expeditions down the western coast of Af-
rica, and after Henry's death in 1460, Joao II continued his un-
cle's policy of exploration. In 1483, Diego Cao reached the
4. For a discussion of this issue in the South African context, see Lynn Berat, Prose-
cuting Human Rights Violators from a Predecessor Regime: Guidelines for a Trans-
formed South Africa, B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. (1993) (forthcoming). A related question
for the Namibians is what should be done about those now in government who commit-
ted atrocities in SWAPO refugee camps when the group was in exile. The government
has shown no zeal for investigating allegations of misconduct including torture and
disappearances.
5. That duty is described in Berat, supra note 4.
6. Among the archaeological studies are Beatrice Sandelowsky, Mirabib-An
Archaeological Study in the Namib, 10(4) MADOQUA 221 (1977); John Kinahan and
Vogel, Recent Copper-working Sites in Khuiseb Drainage Area, Namibia, 37 S. AFs.
ARCH. BULL. 44 (1982); JOHN KINAHAN, PASTORAL NOMADS OF THE NAMIB (1992).
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mouth of the Zaire River. Two years later, Cao erected a cross to
commemorate his landing at what is still known as Cape Cross.
Outward bound on his epic voyage twelve years later,
Bartholomeu Dias landed at Angra Pequena (now Luderitz);
then, standing far out to sea in a storm, he managed to round
the southern end of the continent and make a landfall near Mos-
sel Bay. On his return journey, Dias sighted what he called the
Cape of Storms7 , and on December 8, 1487, he entered Walvis
Bay in his ship Sao Cristoforo and named it Golfo de Santa Ma-
ria de Conceicao. Eleven years later, Vasco da Gama followed
Dias's route around the Cape and then sailed along the East Af-
rican coast as far as Malindi, near Mombasa, where he engaged
an Arab pilot to steer him across the Indian Ocean to Calicut.
European trade with the East increasingly linked the Cape route
after the Portuguese had opened it up to European shipping,
but not until after the Dutch took possession of the Cape in the
mid-seventeenth century did the modern history of Namibia
begin.
In 1652, the Dutch East India Company established a re-
freshment station at the Cape for vessels travelling to and from
the Far East. In due course, the company sent exploratory expe-
ditions from the Cape up the West Coast to ascertain who in-
habited the region and whether the Dutch could establish trad-
ing relations with them. Commanders of the vessels gave
unfavorable reports of fighting between their men and the local
inhabitants, whom they called Hottentots.'
Perhaps as a result of these accounts, the Dutch showed no
further interest in the West Coast for more than a century.
Whalers from other countries were not deterred, however. By
the end of the eighteenth century, American, British, and
French seamen were all engaged in whaling operations along the
7. Subsequently named the Cape of Good Hope.
8. Now Kozhikode, a seaport in southwest India.
9. Sydow, Contributions to the History and Protohistory of the Topnaar Stran-
dloper Settlement at the Kuiseb river Mouth near Walvis Bay, 28 S. AFR. ARCH. BULL.
73 (1973). The term Hottentots, which has taken on a derogatory connotation, referred
to indigenous pastoral peoples. In modern scholarship, the term Khoikhoi is used in-
stead. The term Bushmen referred to indigenous hunter-gatherers. In modern, scholar-
ship the term San has replaced it. Both groups are often referred to in the literature as
Khoisan.
1993]
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coast. Once there, they encountered the indigenous inhabitants
of its shores.' 0
By that time, rumors were proliferating of vast herds of
game and cattle as well as of huge copper deposits, in the area
north of the Orange River. The British had already sent expedi-
tions to explore the West Coast in 1784 and 1786. Fearing that
Britain might claim the West Coast, including Walvis Bay, the
Dutch sent the Meermin under Captain Francois Duminy to the
West Coast. On February 24, 1793, Duminy arrived at Walvis
Bay where the local Nama-speaking people were exploiting the
marine life, herding cattle, and using the "!nara" 11 melon. With-
out consulting any of the local inhabitants, Duminy took sym-
bolic possession of Walvis Bay.12 This marked the first time a
European power attempted to annex part of what is now
Namibia. However, according to the international law of the pe-
riod, this symbolic act was insufficient to effect a valid
annexation.'3
Even nominal Dutch authority over the Bay was short-lived.
In 1795, France invaded Holland. Believing that France might
gain control of the sea route to India, the British government
sent a naval force to the Cape. The Dutch capitulated and the
British took control of the Cape. The following year, the Cape
government sent Captain Alexander in the frigate Star up the
West Coast to inspect its bays, including Walvis Bay, and to
take possession of them for Britain.
Alexander also made a symbolic annexation which, like that
by the Dutch before, failed to comply with prevailing standards
of international law and was thus ineffective.' 4 Nevertheless, the
10. See, e.g., Cecille, Bericht uber die Fahrt der Korvette L'Heroine, 31 MIT-
TEILUNGEN Aus DEN DEUTSCHEN SCHUTZGEBIETEN: DIE ALTESTEN REISEBERICHTE
DEUTSCH-SUDWEST AFRIKAS (1918); J. ALEXANDER, AN EXPEDITION OF DISCOVERY INTO THE
INTERIOR OF AFRICA (1838).
11. Nama is one of several click languages, so-called because of the distinctive pro-
nunciation of some of their consonant sounds. The '" is used to indicate one of the
clicks.
12. English Translation of Parts of Sebastian Valentyn van Reenen's Journal of
the Expedition to Walfish Bay, 1793, in DUMINY-DAGBOEKE 304 (J. Franken ed. 1938);
Sebastian van Reenen, Report, 28 MITTEILUNGEN Aus DEN DEUTSCHEN SCHUTZGEBIETEN
(1915).
13. The requirements for a valid annexation are discussed in detail in BERAT, supra
note 1, at 109-22.
14. BERAT, supra note 1, at 110.
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British claimed that the whaling and sealing grounds off the
coast were under their exclusive domain and commissioned a
cruiser to protect those industries from exploitation by foreign
nationals. By early in the nineteenth century, European and
American explorers, traders, and missionaries, as well as naval
vessels, began to arrive in the Walvis Bay area. Their written
accounts gave often ethnocentric and unflattering descriptions of
the local inhabitants, whom they called Topnaar and whose
numbers they estimated in the hundreds. Whereas earlier visi-
tors reported that the Topnaar did not know hunger, by the end
of the century, observers indicated that they had become impov-
erished and that they formed the base of the labor force used to
load and unload boats that put into the Bay. 15 The Topnaar
were in this condition because of decades of social upheavals
that led to the eventual British annexation of Walvis Bay and
the German annexation of the rest of what is now Namibia.
It is not known when the first Nama-speaking people ar-
rived in what is today Namibia. The historian Richard Elphick
suggests, however, and anthropological linguists support the pro-
position, that they originated somewhere in present-day Bot-
swana and gradually moved south and west." The Nama were
hunter-gatherers; some also became pastoralists at about the
time of Christ.
Apart from the little archaeological data available and infor-
mation furnished by ethnocentric missionaries, travelers, and
traders, little is known about the life of the Nama-speakers of
southern and central Namibia before their first contact with
Europeans. Various ethnographic works written after World War
15. Compare Cecille and ALEXANDER, supra note 10 with WILLIAM PALGRAVE, RE-
PORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER TO THE TRIBES NORTH OF THE ORANGE RIVER OF HIS
MISSION TO DAMARLAND AND GREAT NAMAQUALAND IN 1876, at 6 (1877); THE JOURNAL OF
JOSEPH TINDALL 70 ( B. Tindall ed. 1950).
16. R. ELPHICK, KRAAL AND CASTLE: KHOIKHOI AND THE FOUNDING OF WHITE SOUTH
AFRICA (1977); Anita Pfouts, Economy and Society in Pre-Colonial Namibia: A Linguis-
tic Approach (c. 1500-1800 A.D.), Paper for African Studies Conference, Boston (Dec.
6-10, 1983), and reproduced as Paper No. 30, International Conference on Namibia,
City University, London (Sept. 10-13, 1984); Christopher Ehret, Patterns of Bantu and
Central Sudanic Settlement in Central and Southern Africa (c. 1000 B.C.-500 A.D.), 3
TRANSAFRICAN J. HIST. 64 (1973); Christopher Ehret, The Spread of Food Production in
Southern Africa, in THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC RECONSTRUCTION OF AFRICAN
HISTORY 158-81 (Christopher Ehret & M. Posnansky eds. 1982). The Nama languages
belong to the northern and central branches of the Khoisan families.
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I about the peoples of Namibia claim to reveal information on
precontact social structure, but their conclusions are unreliable.
Written from a structural-functionalist perspective, which re-
garded ethnic groups as discrete entities for analytical purposes,
these studies are ahistorical.1 7 In addition, they accept oral in-
formation gathered in this century as sufficiently accurate evi-
dence for the reconstruction of social and political formations
that flourished more than a century earlier, even though the de-
struction of the old order was complete long before any of these
ethnographic materials were collected.
What is certain, however, is that at the turn of the century,
Nama-speaking groups shared structures of sociopolitical and
economic organization, language, myths, and rites. They also
had a consciousness of being related to one another that they
expressed in genealogical terms, real or fictitious. They did not
live in rigidly defined territorial groupings. Although they all
had their own water holes, these were not limited to a specific
territory but were widely dispersed."8 In the context of settle-
ment patterns, people were not separated into strictly defined
territories but lived in an intermixed or checkerboard fashion.
Precontact Nama social organization was based on kinship
ties and the acquisition of cattle and clients to enhance one's
status rather than on capitalist means of gaining wealth, such as
commodity exchange. Decision-making processes, distribution of
cattle posts, and distribution of power were determined by kin-
ship relations. Each group appears to have been ruled by a chief
who controlled a system of reciprocity, surplus extraction, and
accumulation that was characteristic of many precapitalist Afri-
can societies. This encouraged followers to become dependent
upon their chiefs and buttressed chiefly power.19 This seems to
have been the system that prevailed throughout Namibia south
of the Swakop River, in the vast area inhabited by these Nama-
speaking people that came to be known to Europeans as Nama-
17. See, e.g., R. Hoernle, The Social Organisation of the Nama Hottentots of South
West Africa, AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 6 (1925); ISAAC SCHAPERA, THE KHOISAN PEOPLES OF
SOUTH AFRICA (1930).
18. R. Hoernle, supra note 17, at 72.
19. Wesleyan Missionary Notices (1821), Shaw, Account, 120 (Cory Library,
Grahamstown, South Africa) [hereinafter WMN].
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land or Great Namaqualand.20
North of the Swakop boundary line was Damaraland, also
called Hereroland-roughly the area north of Windhoek up to
Otavi, though during the 1870s it also included Windhoek.2 1
From the mid-eighteenth century on, this area was populated
mainly by diverse and largely unconnected groups of pastoral
nomads who spoke the Herero language.2 2 Like Great Namaqua-
land, the area was ultimately incorporated into a larger system
of economic and social relationships dominated by merchant
capital that destroyed the old order. The first agents of this
profound change were the Orlam.
By the end of the eighteenth century, people who became
known as Orlam were moving across the Orange River.2 3 A com-
20. Transactions of the London Missionary Society, III, 212 (Cape Archives Bureau,
hereinafter KAB) [hereinafter TLMS]; London Missionary Society Letters [hereinafter
LMS], A. Albrecht, Observations, n.d. (KAB).
It is not clear when the term Great Namaqualand came into use. As early as 1805,
missionaries of the London Missionary Society wrote of the people residing on the north-
ern side of the Orange River as Great Namaquas. LMS Journals, Albrecht, August 30,
1905 (KAB). As early as 1796 these people were referred to as Great Nimaquas. K.
Budack, Die Traditionelle politische Struktur der KhoeKhoen in SudwestAfrika 22,
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pretoria (1972). By that time it was also known that
north of the Great Namaquas lived the Tamaras, or Damaras. After groups of people
known as Orlam moved from Little Namaqualand, the area just across the Cape Colony's
Orange River northern boundary, and the Cape Colony into Namaland at the end of the
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries and the Afrikaner Orlam estab-
lished themselves under Jonker Afrikaner at what is now Windhoek, a rough borderline
was drawn in the north along the Swakop River. Thus, Great Namaqualand, which in-
cluded what is today the Walvis Bay territory, became a fairly well-defined area,
bounded by the Atlantic in the west, the Kalahari Desert in the east, the Swakop River
in the north, and the Orange River in the south.
21. In the far north was Ovamboland, populated by people speaking the Ovambo
language. With nearly 700,000 people, the Ovambo comprise almost fifty-five percent of
modern Namibia's population of 1,252,500. U.N. Institute for Namibia 1970 census
figures quoted in SwApo, To BE BORN A NATION 3 (1981) (670,000 Ovambo constitute
fifty-three and one-half percent of the population.). See generally Richard Moorsom and
Clarence Smith, Underdevelopment and Class Formation in Ovamboland, in THE ROOTS
OF RURAL POVERTY (Robin Palmer & Neil Parsons eds. 1977).
22. Pfouts, supra note 16 at 5. The Herero language falls into the Bantu sub-branch
of the Benue-Congo branch of the Niger-Congo family. As a result of the paucity of
archaeological evidence, it is not clear when the first Herero-speakers entered Namibia.
One theory is that they arrived from the east in the mid-sixteenth century and began to
push south in the second half of the eighteenth century. See T. SUNDERMEIER DIE
MBANDERU 11-17 (1977). In 1876, Palgrave estimated their population to be 85,000.
Sandelowsky, supra note 6 at 83.
23. The origin of the word Orlam is disputed. One scholar argues that it came from
1993]
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bination of Nama-speaking hunters, gatherers, and pastoral peo-
ples whose societies had been destroyed by expanding merchant
capitalism at the Cape, people of mixed descent, and fugitive
slaves, the Orlam were westernized dependents of white farmers,
traders, and hunters. They knew how to use guns, wore western
clothing, were Christian, and had a knowledge of Dutch.2 They
depended for survival upon European trade goods, and because
their knowledge of pastoral techniques had decayed or long since
disappeared, they procured cattle to pay for desired commodi-
ties by raiding the stock of Nama- and Herero-speakers. They
carried out their raiding through the institution of the com-
mando. 25 As Orlam groups moved across the Orange River, they
established dominance first over Nama- and then over Herero-
speakers. Their success was a result of the commando's superior-
ity, which was largely due to the use of guns and horses. The
fact that the Nama- and Herero-speakers possessed large herds
may also have made them easy victims, because the herds could
not be moved readily and easily. Their decline was hastened by
a brutal and lengthy war instigated by the white missionaries
and traders who had moved into the area.2 6 Thereafter, their
fate was sealed by the struggles of the colonial powers for domi-
nance in Africa.
Thus, by the 1870s, the Cape Colony had been granted re-
sponsible government and Prime Minister Sir John Molteno and
his government took an interest in what is now Namibia. Curios-
ity about the area was high because rumors of great mineral
the phrase "over land." Kienetz, The Key Role of the Orlam Migrations in the Early
Europeanisation of South West Africa (Namibia), 10 INT'L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 554
(1977).
24. Martin Legassick, The Northern Frontier to 1820: The Emergence of the Gri-
qua People, in THE SHAPING OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY, 1652-1820 (Richard Elphick &
Hermann Giliomee eds. 1979); J. Du Bruyn, The Orlam Afrikaners: From Dependence to
Dominance, c. 1760-1823, at 6, University of South Africa (1981) (unpublished paper);
Emma Bradlow, The Significance of Arms and Ammunition on the Cape Frontier at the
Turn of the Eighteenth Century, 26(1) HISTORIA (1981).
25. See generally Brigitte Lau, The Emergence of Kommando Politics in Namaland,
Southern Namibia, 1800-1870, at 84-103 (1982) (M.A. thesis, University of Cape Town)
[hereinafter B. Lau, M.A. thesis]; Brigitte Lau, The Kommando in Southern Namibia,
1800-1870, in NAMIBIA: PAST AND PRESENT (Christopher Saunders ed., University of Cape
Town, Centre for African Studies, Occasional Papers No. 4, 1983).
26. The war of the missionaries and traders is described in BERAT, supra note 1, at
27-29.
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wealth abounded.2 7 The possibility of acquiring the area also in-
trigued Molteno because control of it meant control over trade,
especially in guns and gunpowder, with the interior.2 8 Mean-
while, the British government itself feared the presence of the
Portuguese2" in the area as well as the creation of an Afrikaner
republic"0 in the region. After considerable political confusion,
Britain decided to exercise jurisdiction over Walvis Bay.$1 Thus,
in 1878, Richard Cossantine Dyer, the commander of HMS In-
dustry, issued a proclamation annexing Walvis Bay to Her Maj-
esty's dominions.3 2 That same year, the British government ap-
proved of Dyer's annexation. 3 Six years, however, were to elapse
before the territory was formally annexed to the Cape."' That
event occurred only in the face of rising German interest in the
area.
As early as 1868 groups had formed in Germany to promote
German colonization. German trade with Africa and Asia, al-
though only a fraction of the country's total trade, grew steadily
in the 1870s."6 As long as there was free trade in the colonial
world, Germany was content with access to the markets. In the
1880s, however, there were signs that free trade was ending as
the colonial powers began to favor their own nationals through
the use of differential tariffs and other restrictive legislation. 6
Hence, Bismarck felt a need for German colonization.
In May 1883, an agent of F.A.E. Luderitz, a Bremen
27. Gold and silver had been discovered in Damaraland. The belief arose that Great
Namaqualand was also laden with minerals.
28. In 1871, the Cape government had endeavored to restrict the trade in guns and
gunpowder by forbidding their shipment to any area beyond the Cape Colony's boundary
without special permission. CAPE ARGUS, March 7, 1874.
29. BERAT, supra note 1, at 31.
30. Id.
31. It did so based on the assumption that the power controlling the Bay would also
control the hinterland because the Bay was the territory's only harbor and contained the
only supply of fresh water in the vicinity. BERAT, supra note 1, at 36-37, 47-48.
32. A.14-'81 at 20-25; C.2144 at 8, Enclosure No. 5; 69 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 1177.
33. 70 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 495-96.
34. 75 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 407.
35. Henry Turner, Bismarck's Imperialist Venture: Anti-British in Origin?, in
BRITAIN AND GERMANY IN AFRICA 47, 50-51 (Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis eds.
1967).
36. Id.
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merchant, purchased Angra Pequena harbor and the land sur-
rounding it in a five-mile radius from Captain Josef Frederiks,
leader of the Bethanie people." Three months later Frederiks,
in a treaty signed with an "X", purportedly sold Luderitz the
entire coast from the Orange River to the twenty-sixth degree of
southern latitude, including all the harbors and bays as well as
the hinterland to a distance of twenty miles. 8 Once more, Lu-
deritz called for German protection.
On April 24, Bismarck cabled the German consul at Cape
Town with instructions to declare officially that Luderitz and his
establishment were under German protection. In light of this de-
velopment, the Cape Colony annexed Walvis Bay. On July 24,
1884, the Cape Colonial Parliament passed the Walfish Bay and
St. John's River Annexation Act (No. 35 of 1884),- 9 and on Au-
gust 7, the governor issued a formal Proclamation of Annexation
(No. 184).4o With the exception of the Cape's annexation of the
Bay, it was too late for British designs on Damaraland and Na-
maland. Germany had decided to act. On August 7, the same
day that the governor's proclamation of annexation of Walvis
Bay appeared, Captain Schering, commandant of a German war-
ship, complying with orders from the government, put the terri-
tory Luderitz had acquired under German protection and
hoisted the German flag. That territory extended from the north
bank of the Orange River to the twenty-sixth degree of south
latitude, twenty miles inland; it also included all the islands be-
longing thereto by the law of nations,41 namely, those within
gunshot distance of the coast. On August 16, 1884, Schering is-
sued a proclamation announcing the establishment of a German
protectorate over Namaland and Damaraland.42 The day before,
37. G.H. 31/8 at 330, Despatches Sent, No. 230, Aug. 13, 1833; No. 235, Aug. 20, 1833,
at 333 (KAB).
38. 1. GOLDBLATT, HISTORY OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 81 (1971).
39. Walfish Bay & St. John's River Territories Annexation Act No. 35 (1884).
40. Proc. No. 184 (1884), CAPE OF GOOD HOPE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, Aug. 8, 1884,
at 408.
41. The "cannon shot" rule was recorded by Bynkershoek, a Dutch jurist, in the
early nineteenth century. It is traditionally regarded as the basis of the doctrine of the
three-mile limit of territorial waters. Louis HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1297 (2d
ed. 1987).
42. C.4262 at 12-13.
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the German consul at Cape Town had informed the governor of
these actions. On September 5, he told Robinson that Germany
had now also annexed the coast from Cape Frio to Walvis Bay
and from Walvis Bay to the twenty-sixth degree of south lati-
tude. The British government received official confirmation on
October 15 that the area was a German protectorate.4 s With the
proclamation of the protectorate, known as the South West Af-
rica protectorate, the drawing of the boundaries of what would
become Namibia was complete. On July 1, 1890, Britain and
Germany concluded an agreement regarding Africa and Heligo-
land that recognized British authority over Walvis Bay and Ger-
man supremacy over the South West Africa protectorate."
B. German Rule
German rule proved to be extremely brutal with especially
disastrous consequences for the Nama/Orlam and the Herero. In
October 1890, the Germans occupied Windhoek, and three years
later they established an official German colonial administration
there. In 1894, Theodore Leutwein became the first Colonial
Governor of German South West Africa. His appointment came
after various German military defeats against the people of
South West Africa, most notably, a campaign against the Nama/
Orlam Witboois, many of whom perished.' 5 Leutwein had merce-
nary views about the nature of colonialism. Thus, he wrote,
[s]tripped of all idealistic and humanitarian impediments, the fi-
nal objective of all colonization is to make money. The colonizing
race has no intention of bringing happiness to the aboriginal peo-
ple, the kind of happiness that the latter perhaps expects. In the
first instance, the conquerors seek their own advantage. Such
objectives correspond to human egotism, and therefore accord
with nature. Colonial policy must therefore be determined by the
expected profits.'
With such views, Leutwein opposed any marriages between Ger-
43. E. HERTSLETT, 2 MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY 693 (1909).
44. Agreement, reprinted in M. HURST, 2 KEY TREATIES FOR GREAT POWERS 873
(1972).
45. HORST DRECHSLER, LET Us DIE FIGHTING 7-9, 74-75 (1980).
46. LOUIS GANN & PETER DUIGNAN, THE RULERS OF GERMAN AFRICA 1884-1914, at 44
(1977).
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man settlers and the territory's native inhabitants on the
grounds that those from mixed marriages might eventually de-
mand self-rule from Germany and the protectorate and its eco-
nomic assets would be lost.4 7 Indeed, under Leutwein, the regis-
try offices adopted a policy of not registering mixed marriages. 8
Also, the German authorities endeavored to subdue the local
populace by entering into agreements with their chiefs; those
who accepted the German offers received as much as two thou-
.sand German marks a year.4 9 At the same time, the Germans
established reserves where the country's indigenous inhabitants
were forced to live.60
However, not all local leaders accepted collaboration. Most
famous of these was Hendrik Witbooi of the Nama/Orlam who
opposed the German policy and warned his peers against such
behavior. As early as 1892, he wrote to Josef Frederiks of
Bethanie who had sold the coast of the country to Luderitz,
[t]hey [the Germans] are the big nation trying to enter our lands
with power. I can already see them governing us with their might.
I can see them passing laws that forbid us to do things we are
accustomed to do. I therefore cannot agree to your giving away
land which would permit these Germans to live and work here...
I cannot see any peace coming out of this arrival of the Germans.
Incidentally, they praise their own deeds and strength far too
much."1
Accordingly, Witbooi adamantly opposed entering into a protec-
47. Id. at 227.
48. In 1907, the High Court in Windhoek even insisted that all such marriages that
occurred before 1905 were null and void. The decision affected thirty marriages but
mixed relationships continued so that in 1908 there were five hundred mixed births re-
corded. HELMUT BLEY, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA UNDER GERMAN RULE 1894-1914, at 212-19
(1971).
49. Id.
50. WADE PENDLETON, KATATURA: A PLACE WHERE WE Do NOT STAY 24 (1974); Hen-
ning Melber, Socio-Economic Interaction and Establishment of Colonial-Capitalist Re-
lations in Namibis Before And During German Rule, in ALLIES IN APARTHEID: WESTERN
CAPITALISM IN OCCUPIED NAMIBIA 21-22 (Allan Cooper ed. 1988). In 1891, there were three
hundred Germans in South West Africa. By 1903, there were 4,640 whites of whom some
three thousand were German. HELMUTH STOECKER, GERMAN IMPERIALISM IN AFRICA
(1986).
51. NAMA/NAMIBIA: DIARY AND LETTERS OF NAMA CHIEF HENDRIK WITBOOI, 1884-
1894, at 73 (1984). Witbooi's writings are also found in THE HENDRIK WITBOOI PAPERS
(Annemarie Heywood and Eben Maasdorp eds., Brigitte Lau annotator 1989).
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tion treaty with Germany.2 The Germans met this resistance
with force and so, in October 1894, the Witboois began a three-
year guerrilla struggle against the Germans during which the
Witboois suffered serious economic and'human losses.5
By the time the struggle of the Witboois subsided, tragedy
also struck the Herero. In 1897, rinderpest 5' killed most of their
cattle . 5 The loss of their main means of sustenance forced many
Herero to sell their land to the Germans or enter the wage labor
market. Some of the Herero, however, resisted submission to
German rule. For example, Herero leader Samuel Maherero, the
Supreme Chief, who himself had collaborated with the Germans
from 1894 to 1903,56 planned a revolt.5 1 In a January 11, 1904,
letter to Hendrik Witbooi, in which he sought the latter's sup-
port, Maherero expressed his views of the cruelty of German
rule and wrote, "All our obedience and patience with the
Germans is of little avail, for each day they shoot someone dead
for no reason at all... Let us die fighting rather than die as a
result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some other calamity." 58
The message never reached Witbooi and the Herero commenced
their war against the Germans alone on January 12, 1904. Ini-
tially, they were victorious. They recaptured most of the land
they had lost and seized most of the Germans' livestock, killing
more than one hundred Germans in the process.
Almost as soon as the Herero began their uprising, voices
came from German officials demanding that the Herero be com-
pletely vanquished. Two days after the revolt commenced, the
German Colonial League's Executive Committee released a pam-
phlet accusing Leutwein of letting the Herero behave as they
did. 9 The pamphlet maintained that
[a]nyone familiar with the life of Africa and other less-civilized
52. Protection treaties are discussed in BERAT, supra note 1, at 111-13.
53. WOODRUFF SMITH, THE GERMAN COLONIAL EMPIRE 127 (1978).
54. An acute, contagious virus disease, chiefly of cattle, characterized by ulceration
of the intestinal tract.
55. Id.
56. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 143.
57. This rebellion is described at length in JON BRIDGMAN, THE REVOLT OF THE HER-
EROS (1982).
58. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 143. The rinderpest is described in SMITH, supra
note 53, at 63.
59. Id.
1993]
13
PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW
non-white peoples knows that Europeans can assert themselves
only by maintaining the supremacy of their race at all costs.
Moreover, anyone familiar with the situation knows that the
swifter and harsher the reprisals taken against rebels, the better
the chances of restoring authority.60
Shortly thereafter, the Commandant of Swakopmund sent a tel-
egram to the German Foreign Office demanding that "[t]he Her-
ero must be disarmed, mercilessly punished and rounded up to
perform forced labor for the railway." 61 In the same vein, a Colo-
nial Department official responsible for South West African af-
fairs wrote, "All here in the colony agree that this rebellion must
be put down with severity and that all those responsible must
receive their just desserts. 6 2 The Commander of the Imperial
Naval Vessel Habicht informed the Imperial Naval Office that
"[t]he most severe punishment needs to be inflicted on the en-
emy... The only way to restore calm and confidence among the
whites is to disarm the rebels completely and to confiscate all
their land and cattle."63 A missionary from the Rhenish Mission-
ary Society wrote that
[tihe Germans are consumed with inexpiable hatred and a terri-
ble thirst for revenge, one might even say they are thirsting for
the blood of the Herero. All you hear these days is 'make a clean
sweep, hang them, shoot them to the last man, give no quarter.' I
shudder to think what may happen in the months ahead. The
Germans will doubtless exact a grim vengeance. 4
In their battles with the Herero, German forces appeared to
adhere to a policy like that which the advocates of severity had
demanded. Their behavior became known in Germany itself; in
March 1904, the leader of the Social Democratic Party brought
the issue of the Herero before the Reichstag and objected to the
brutal methods being used by German troops. 5
Leutwein himself admitted to the Director of the Colonial
Department that no Herero prisoners had been captured by May
60. Id.
61. Id. at 144-45.
62. Id. at 145.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 151.
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1904.60 While he insisted that no orders not to take prisoners
had been given, he also indicated that no orders to be lenient
had been delivered either. He noted, "[i]t is only natural, how-
ever, that after all that has happened our soldiers do not show
excessive leniency. ' 67 Nevertheless, despite the widespread sen-
timent in favor of continued German bellicosity, Leutwein began
negotiations with Maharero to the dismay of the government in
Berlin, which insisted that Leutwein demand unconditional sur-
render.66 Leutwein defended his actions and, primarily on eco-
nomic grounds, argued against those who envisioned obliterating
the Herero. He wrote,
The insurgents must know that there is an alternative to death.
. . After all, the natives have nothing to lose now but their lives -
and they are doomed anyway... As regards the future terms for
subjugation,... after all the outrages the Herero have committed
nothing short of unconditional surrender will have to be enforced.
On the other hand, I do not concur with those fanatics who want
to see the Herero destroyed altogether. Apart from the fact that a
people of 60,000 or 70,000 is not so easy to annihilate, I would
consider such a move a grave mistake from an economic point of
view. We need the Herero as cattle breeders, though on a small
scale, and especially as laborers. It will be quite sufficient if they
are politically dead. If this is practicable, they should be denied
any form of tribal government and confined to reserves adequate
for their needs...69
In the face of continued German losses, the authorities in Berlin
did not find Leutwein's arguments persuasive. Accordingly, in
April 1904, Wilhelm II appointed Lieutenant-General Lothar
von Trotha Commander-in-Chief of the German forces in South
West Africa. Von Trotha had acquired a reputation for ruthless-
ness in dealing with indigenous peoples elsewhere in the world.
He had been responsible for brutally suppressing the Wahehe
rebellion in East Africa in 1896 and the Boxer Rebellion in
China in 1900_01.70
The General arrived in South West Africa on June 11, 1904.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 148.
69. Id.
70. Id.
1993]
15
PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW
He told Leutwein,
I know enough tribes in Africa. They all have the same mentality
insofar as they yield only to force. It was and remains my policy
to apply this force by unmitigated terrorism and even cruelty. I
shall destroy the rebellious tribes by shedding rivers of blood and
money.71
He later wrote to Leutwein,
I did not receive any instructions or directives on being appointed
Commander-in-Chief in South West Africa. His Majesty the Em-
peror only said that he expected me to crush the rebellion by fair
means or foul and to inform him later of the causes that had pro-
voked the uprising. 72
Leutwein recommended offering the Herero clemency if they
surrendered but von Trotha rejected the idea.7 3 In August 1904,
German forces engaged the Herero in the vicinity of Waterburg.
The Herero were defeated and Von Trotha then placed his
forces in such a way so to ensure that the only escape route
available to the Herero was through the arid Omaheke desert.
The German General Staff extolled this tactic in an official re-
port indicating that
[i]f, however, the Herero were to break through, such an outcome
of the battle could only be more desirable in the eyes of the Ger-
man command because the enemy would then seal his own fate,
being doomed to die of thirst in the arid sandveld... This bold
enterprise shows up in the most brilliant light the ruthless energy
of the German command in pursuing their beaten enemy. No
pains, no sacrifices were spared in eliminating the last remnants
of enemy resistance. Like a wounded beast the enemy was
tracked down from the water-hole to the next, until finally he be-
came the victim of his own environment. The arid Omaheke was
to complete what the German Army had begun: the extermina-
tion of the Herero nation.
4
71. Id.
72. Id. at 153-54.
73. Id. at 149, 153-54.
74. Id. at 155-56; BLEY, supra note 48, at 162. A guide for the Germans later stated
under oath that "[a]fter the battle [at Hamakiri near Waterberg] all men, women and
children who fell into German hands, wounded or otherwise, were mercilessly put to
death. Then the Germans set off in pursuit of the rest, and all those found by the way-
side and in the sandveld were shot down or bayonetted to death. The mass of the Herero
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Subsequently, it appears, von Trotha became even more
ruthless. On October 2, 1904, he issued an extermination order
which stipulated,
The Herero people will have to leave the country. Otherwise, I
shall force them to do so by means of guns. Within the German
boundaries, every Herero, whether found armed or unarmed, with
or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any more women
and children. I shall drive them back to their people-otherwise I
shall order shots to be fired at them. These are my words to the
Herero people.7"
Two days later, von Trotha sent an official report to the Chief of
the Army General Staff in which he remained vehemently op-
posed to negotiations. He wrote,
As I see it, the nation must be destroyed as such and, should this
prove impossible to achieve by tactical moves, they will have to
be forced out of the country through a long-term strategy...
Since I neither can nor will come to terms with these people with-
out express orders from His Majesty the Emperor and King, it is
essential that all sections of the nation be subjected to rather
stern treatment. I have begun to administer such treatment on
my own initiative and, barring orders to the contrary, will con-
men were unarmed and thus unable to offer resistance. They were just trying to get away
with their cattle." DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 157. However, the Namibian historian
Brigitte Lau insists that the German forces required two weeks to recover from the en-
gagement and that the subsequent pursuit was generally unsuccessful. Brigitte Lau, Un-
certain Certainties: The Herero-German War of 1904, MIBAGUS No. 2 (Windhoek, April
1989) [hereinafter MIBAGUSI; Brigitte Lau, Letter to the Editor, Southern African Re-
view of Books (June/July 1990) [hereinafter cited as Letter]. It is irrelevant whether the
actual physical pursuit was successful because the Germans knew that the desert route
was so inhospitable that many Herero were sure to perish. Moreover, the guide's account
of atrocities was mirrored by many others in the employ of the Germans. For examples,
see DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 158.
75. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 157. No German record of the order exists and
Lau, who disputes the notion that genocide occurred, maintains that the authority for it
is not reliable. Lau, MIBAGUS, supra note 74; Lau, Letter, supra note 74. However, it is
arguable that the veracity of the order can be confirmed by subsequent references to it in
German colonial documents. On a slightly more humane level, the order seems to have
been accompanied by an instruction to the army that "the firing of shots at women and
children means firing over their heads to drive them away. I am in no doubt that as a
result of this order no more male prisoners will be taken, but neither will it give rise to
atrocities committed on women and children. These will surely run away after two
rounds of shot have been fired over their heads." DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 157;
BLEY, supra note 48, at 164. Von Trotha and his troops disregarded the instruction. See
infra notes 91, 94, 97 and accompanying text.
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tinue to do so as long as I am in command here... Before my
departure yesterday I ordered the warriors captured recently to
be court-martialled and hanged and all women and children who
sought shelter here to be driven back into the sandveld... To
accept women and children who are for the most part sick, poses
a grave risk to the force, and to feed them is out of the question.
For this reason, I deem it wiser for the entire nation to perish
than to infect our soldiers into the bargain and to make inroads
into our water and food supplies. Over and above this, any ges-
ture of leniency on my part would only be regarded as a sign of
weakness by the Herero."
But more than three weeks later, on October 27, von Trotha
wrote to Leutwein indicating that
[t]hroughout my period of duty here, the eastern border of the
colony will remain sealed off and terrorism will be employed
against any Herero showing up. That nation must vanish from
.the face of the earth. Having failed to destroy them with guns, I
will have to achieve my end in that way.
7 7
This communication began a dispute between Leutwein and von
Trotha. Leutwein asked the Foreign Office in Berlin to allow
him to give an order permitting the surrender of the Herero.
The Foreign Office, however, sided with von Trotha and recalled
Leutwein to Germany by granting him home leave. 78 Von Trotha
then became Governor of South West Africa from November
1904.79
At that time, criticism of von Trotha's behavior arose from
certain missionaries, some civilian groups, and even the Colonial
Department." For example, the Chief of the Army General Staff
informed the Imperial Chancellor that von Trotha's "plans to
wipe out the entire nation or to drive them out of the country
are meeting with our approval." '8 1 He continued,
[t]he racial struggle that has erupted can be brought to an end
only by destroying one side or reducing it to serfdom. The latter
76. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 160-61. In the letter, Von Trotha wrote three
times that the Herero had to be destroyed. BLEY, supra note 48, at 164.
77. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 161.
78. Id. at 161-62.
79. BLEY, supra note 48, at 159.
80. Id. at 164-65.
81. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 163.
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proposition is an unrealistic one, given the views that are preva-
lent. So while General von Trotha's intentions are commendable,
he is powerless to carry them out. . . We will have no choice,
therefore, but to try to induce the Herero to surrender. This is
complicated by General von Trotha's order to shoot each and
every Herero. s2
In response, the Chancellor lobbied Kaiser Wilhelm to rescind
von Trotha's order and accept the surrender of the Herero. The
Chancellor argued on economic, humanitarian, and strategic
grounds. He noted that "if the rebellious natives were annihi-
lated or expelled, this would seriously undermine the colony's
potential for development. '83 Moreover, the policy of shooting
all the men and forcing the women and children into the desert
to perish was "contradictory to all Christian and human princi-
ples. '84 In addition, the proclamation was "demeaning to our
standing among the civilized nations of the world."8 5 The Kaiser
eventually accepted these views.
On December 8, he rescinded von Trotha's order and indi-
cated that he "would exercise clemency" with regard to those
Herero who voluntarily surrendered as long as they had not been
responsible for decision-making or killings. 6 The General Staff
construed the order narrowly for von Trotha, informing him
that, "His Majesty has not forbidden you to fire on the Herero.
On the contrary... [b]ut the possibility of showing mercy, ruled
out by the proclamation of 2 October, is. . . to be restored
again. ' '87 Von Trotha met his new orders with consternation and
lobbied in favor of his approach until he left for Germany in
November 1905.88 Shortly before that, he received a medal of
honor from the Kaiser.89
Von Trotha was succeeded as Governor by Friedrich von
Lindequist whose policies were more akin to those of Leutwein.
On December 1, he issued a proclamation indicating that he had
82. Id. at 163-64; BLEY, supra note 48, at 165-66.
83. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 164.
84. Id. at 162-63; BLEY, supra note 48, at 163, 166.
85. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 164.
86. BLEY, supra note 48, at 167.
87. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 164.
88. BLEY, supra note 48, at 167.
89. Id. at 165, 169.
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instructed two missionaries to open reception camps for those
Herero still at large and that, as of December 20, military opera-
tions in Hereroland and German raiding of Herero camps would
cease. Those who surrendered at the centers were almost imme-
diately forced to labor for the Germans under extremely harsh
conditions with the result that many perished.90 As time went
on, .the condition of the Herero - both in the camps and at large
- grew ever more parlous. By mid-1906, von Lindequist wrote to
the Colonial Department that "[tlhe northern and central parts
of the country, in particular Hereroland proper, are virtually de-
void of Herero. . . The Herero have lost the will to fight arms in
hand and to put up resistance. Those still roaming about will
consider themselves lucky if they come to no harm." 1 However,
because the German settlers claimed to fear that the concentra-
tion of large numbers of Herero in the two locales would lead to
another uprising, von Lindequist closed the camps and distrib-
uted the Herero among the settlers as laborers.9 2 He also re-
scinded his December 1905 proclamation and ordered that mili-
tary action against the Herero be resumed. Meanwhile, under
the terms of the Imperial Decree of 26 December Pertaining to
the Sequestration of Property of Natives in the Protectorate of
South West Africa,9" von Lindequist had declared that all of
Hereroland belonged to Germany.
In the end, the Herero were vanquished. Although it is im-
possible to arrive at an exact figure, it is certain that large num-
bers of Herero perished. The most frequently cited statistics
come from the historians Helmut Bley and Horst Drechsler.
Bley estimated that seventy-five to eighty percent of the Herero
died by the end of 1905. This meant that the population de-
clined from between sixty thousand and eighty thousand to
about sixteen thousand, of whom fourteen thousand were in con-
90. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 207-08.
91. Id. at 208.
92. Id. at 208. Large numbers of Herero also perished in the concentration camps.
According to the Imperial Colonial Office's Report on the Mortality in Prisoner-of-War
Camps in German South West Africa, dispatches from October 1904 to March 1907
revealed that 7,682 of the approximately fifteen thousand Herero and two thousand
Nama, 45.2% of the total, perished. Id. at 214.
93. Id. at 208.
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centration camps. e4 According to Drechsler, who relied on 1911
census results as recorded in a 1918 British Report on the Na-
tives of South West Africa and their Treatment by Germany,
"in 1911 there were a mere 15,130 Herero left out of an original
eighty thousand... No fewer than eighty percent of the Herero
had thus fallen victim to German colonial rule."9 5 The fate of
the Herero was shared by the Nama/Orlam.
In August 1904, under the leadership of Jakob Morengo,
some of the Nama/Orlam had taken up arms against the
Germans. On October 4, Hendrik Witbooi led most of the re-
maining Nama/Orlam groups into the guerrilla struggle. Like the
Herero, the Nama/Orlam were initially victorious in their en-
gagements with the Germans. This irked von Trotha who, in the
spring of 1905, went to the southern part of the territory where
he took personal control of the operations against the Nama/
Orlam. On April 22, he issued a proclamation in which he
threatened his opponents with annihilation and insisted that
they surrender unconditionally. 6 The proclamation became
widely known not only in Germany but also in Britain9" but had
no effect on the Nama/Orlam who continued their fight. As criti-
cism of von Trotha's failure to win the war grew among the
Germans in the territory, von Trotha forbade officers returning
to Germany from divulging to the press information about the
political and military situation." The Nama/Orlam persisted
with their guerrilla tactics and, on October 29, 1905, Hendrik
Witbooi, von Trotha's main Nama/Orlam nemesis, died from a
94. BLEY, supra note 48, at 151. Bley claimed that of the fifteen thousand Herero in
prisoner-of-war camps, some forty-five percent died.
95. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 214. Lau disputes the veracity of both the Bley
and Drechsler figures. She maintains that "[n]o comprehensive statistics of Herero and
Nama population figures or death rates during or after the war exist. To report the con-
tradictory guesswork of the colonizers with confidence is already mystifying. The mis-
sionaries questioned their predecessors' Herero population estimates of the 1870's (circa
eighty thousand) among themselves, and as to survivors, there are contradictory counts
by the German General Staff in Windhoek, individual officers, the Colonial Office in Ber-
lin, the Rhenish Mission Society and individual missionaries... There is no such thing as
'the real figure' of POW mortality or survivors." Lau, Letter, supra note 74; see also Lau,
MIBAGUS, supra note 74. However, the precise number of those who perished is unneces-
sary to make out a case for genocide.
96. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 188.
97. Id. at 187.
98. Id. at 188.
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wound sustained in an attack on a German convoy. Von Trotha
rejoiced at the news which, he apparently believed, furnished
him with a pretense for making an exit from the country.99
With von Trotha gone, von Lindequist insisted that the
Nama/Orlam surrender unconditionally. 100 The Witboois, de-
moralized by Hendrik's death, surrendered on February 3, 1906.
Their capitulation was made possible by the fact that Samuel
Isaak, their new leader, was by then acting openly on behalf of
the Germans. 101 With the Witboois subdued, the Germans
turned their attention to the remaining Nama/Orlam leaders,
most notably Cornelius and Morengo. On March 3, 1906, Corne-
lius surrendered.102 The Germans were determined to capture
Morengo at all costs. One German who was later imprisoned for
five years for speaking out, reported that
[n]ot far from Hartbeestmund our troops captured fifty women
and thirty-eight children, but failed to extract from them any in-
formation about Morengo's whereabouts. I am not sure whether it
was for this reason alone or partly because of the difficulties in-
volved in transporting the prisoners that they were all shot.
Maybe both considerations were playing a part. At any rate I feel
ashamed of being a German. 03
Still, Morengo survived. Then, following repeated battles
with the Germans, he fled into the Cape Colony where he sur-
rendered to the British on May 7, 1906, after his band was de-
stroyed by a German deiachment which had pursued them
across the border.
The British held Morengo for more than a year. After his
release, he remained in the Cape Colony but the Germans were
determined to see him and his band dead. The Kaiser himself
ordered von Lindequist to "put a price of 20,000 Marks on
99. Id. at 190.
100. Id. at 191. Von Lindequist wrote, "I do not want them [the Witboois] to be
given any assurances that they will remain at liberty, rather they should be treated as
prisoners of war for a certain period of time. If leniency is shown towards these un-
repentant sinners now, this may have disastrous consequences for the entire native issue
at some later stage... Rash action and excessive leniency are out of place here especially
with regard to the Hottentots [Nama/Orlam]." Id. at 192.
101. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 192.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 193.
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Morengo's head and to wipe out the whole bunch without
mercy." 104 There ensued considerable Anglo-German intrigue
which resulted in Morengo and his men being killed by Cape
police on September 20, 1907.1 Meanwhile, von Lindequist did
not apply the Imperial decree of December 1905 regarding the
sequestration of land to the Nama as he had to the Herero. 106
With Morengo's death, however, on May 8, 1907, Oskar Hin-
trager, the Deputy Governor, issued an order appropriating Na-
maland.10 7 Thus, the Germans also subdued the Nama/Orlam.10s
Like the Herero, their losses seem to have been great.
According to Bley, thirty-five to fifty percent of the Nama
died, thus reducing the population from fifteen thousand to
twenty thousand in 1892 to ninety-eight hundred by 1911.109
Drechsler reports that "in 1911 there were 9,781 Nama out of an
original twenty thousand. No fewer than ... fifty percent of the
Nama had thus fallen victim to German colonial rule." 110 The
104. Id. at 201.
105. Id. at 202.
106. Id. at 216. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. Von Lindequist refrained
from sequestering the land because, as he revealed in an April 25, 1906, message to the
Colonial Department, "[t]he seizure of land might, in fact, have some impact on those
among the Nama who have not yet laid down their arms. The realization that they would
have to make a living through work in the absence of any tribal property would have
diminished their readiness to surrender in the near future." DRECHSLER, supra note 45,
at 216.
107. Id. at 216.
108. Although a small number of Nama/Orlam continued to fight on under Simon
Kopper, who fled with his followers into neighboring British Bechuanaland (modern Bot-
swana), the Germans eventually induced Kopper to accept an annual stipend in ex-
change for not attacking South West Africa. Kopper died in Bechuanaland in January
1913. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 205-07.
109. BLEY, supra note 48, at 151.
110. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 214. Of those who died, many suffered in captiv-
ity. See text accompanying note 114 infra. In the case of the Herero, the German author-
ities transported those captured to Swakopmund where they labored under extremely
onerous conditions building a railway line to Otavi. Any who escaped were put to death
if caught. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 208.
The Germans viewed the Nama differently from the Herero. In the scientific-racist
mode of the day, they considered the Nama to be lazy good-for-nothings. Hence, they
devised a deportation scheme aimed at the eventual extinction of the Nama. In the view
of the Imperial Colonial Office, "[O]nce the rebellion is over, the Hottentots, or rather
what will have remained of them, ought to be shipped to Togo or some other German
colony where they will do not harm, but rather vanish from the scene in the not too
distant future." Id. at 210. As the authorities deemed the cost of deporting the Nama to
other German colonies to be prohibitive, the Witboois ad Bethnaie people eventually
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final blow to the autonomy of the Herero and Nama/Orlam
came on August 18, 1907, when the German authorities issued
three directives which barred the indigenous inhabitants of
South West Africa from owning land or raising cattle, required
all black people over the age of seven to carry passes, and pro-
vided for the prosecution on vagrancy charges of anyone who
could not prove what the source of his livelihood was."
The directives ensured that, thereafter, the remaining Her-
ero and Nama/Orlam would be forced into the wage labor mar-
ket but, despite the directive, in the short term, there was a
dearth of manpower occasioned by the German policies in the
conduct of the campaign against the two groups, 1 2 a shortage
much lamented by the German authorities."' Dr. Otto Bongard
who visited the territory with State Secretary Dernburg on a
fact-finding tour to the territory in 1908, reported that
the Herero have been largely wiped out by the war. A high per-
centage of those who survived are in a deplorable state of health
due to the hardships they endured during the war, the terrible
ordeal they went through in the sandveld where thousands died
of hunger and thirst, and the venereal disease they contracted in
prisoner-of-war camps where infections spread with alarming
speed. To cap it all, their cattle herds were destroyed by the war.
. . Although it can be assumed that those who survived the war
are the most robust of all, the majority of them are beset by dis-
ease to such an extent that they cannot be expected to produce
healthy offspring... Consequently, there is little hope in the fore-
seeable future that the labor reservoir required for the develpp-
ment of the country might be swelled from among the ranks of
the Herero and the Hottentots [Nama/Orlam] (whose situation is
much the same) ... 11
were placed on Shark Island off the South West African coast. The death rate was very
high. For example, in December 1906, 276 died. Id. at 211.
Ultimately, from September 1906 to April 1907, 1,032 of 1,795 Shark Island prison-
ers perished. Id. at 211-212. In contrast, of the estimated 20,867 men deployed by the
Germans, 13,029 either died (mostly from disease) or were returned to Germany because
of illness. LAU, supra note 75 at 5, 8.
111. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 231.
112. Id. at 233.
113. Id. at 232.
114. Oskar Bongard, Dernburgs Studienreise nach Britisch- und Deutsch-
Sudafrika, 25 DEUTSCHE KOLONIALZEITUNG 704 (1908).
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Those who did work toiled under harsh conditions115 which
would not improve once Germany lost its colonial empire.
C. South Africa Takes Charge
In 1915, forces from the Union of South Africa, of which the
Cape Colony had become a part in 1910,116 fighting in World
War I on the side of the Allied and Associated Powers occupied
German South West Africa. After the War, the Union adminis-
tered what had been the German protectorate on behalf of Brit-
ain as a League of Nations C mandate." 7 It also effected the
legislative unity of South West Africa and the Walvis Bay terri-
tory.118 South Africa proceeded to treat the mandate as a veiled
annexation and instituted a harsh system of rule." 9
After World War II, the United Nations replaced the
League of Nations. All mandated territories 2 ' were to come
under the United Nations trusteeship system which envisioned
eventual independence. South Africa refused to submit the
South West Africa mandate to trusteeship and one of the most
protracted international legal disputes of the century ensued. 21
More than four decades elapsed before superpower cooperation
and the declining fortunes of South Africa brought Namibia to
independence in 1990 via United Nations-supervised elections. 22
The country's democratic constitution enshrines myriad human
rights guarantees.12 3 However, despite the good intentions of
those in the new government, Namibia inherited considerable
structural and socio-economic defects. For example, the
Namibian government's inability to attract foreign investment,
despite considerable efforts including the passage of liberal laws,
115. DRECHSLER, supra note 45, at 231-44.
116. The Union came into being via the South Africa Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, ch. 9. The
Union was a white, self-governing British dominion. On the events leading to the crea-
tion of the Union, see LEONARD THOMPSON, THE UNIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 1902-1910
(1960). After the formation of the Union of which the Cape became a part, Walvis Bay
passed from the Cape to the Union. BERAT, supra note 1, at 13.
117. BERAT, supra note 1, at 122-37.
118. The legal process by which this occurred is described at length in id. at 47-67.
119. Id. at 47-89.
120. The mandates system is discussed in BERAT, supra note 1, at 126-131.
121. Id. at 2-12.
122. The independence process is described in Berat and Shain, supra note 1.
123. See Republic of Namibia, Constitution, GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, G.N. 1 (1990).
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is largely the result of a sordid colonial legacy. 12 4 The colonial
boundaries Namibia inherited mean that it is largely desert with
a sparse population.2 6 Consequently, it does not have a domes-
tic market of a size appealing to foreign multinational companies
and also has an unenviable position between economically and
infrastructurally more advanced South Africa and the declining
nations of sub-Saharan Africa. While geography might be sur-
mountable if the population were highly skilled, the complete
lack of regard for African education by Namibia's erstwhile Ger-
man and then South African overlords has created a population
that is barely literate and numerate. 26 The inability to expand
the private sector has meant that the government has bloated
the bureaucracy-with disastrous effects on efficiency-in an ef-
fort to create jobs. Indeed, it is estimated that fifty-five percent
of all employment is in the public sector. 12 7 With such a dismal
inheritance, the desire of the Namibian government to seek re-
muneration for past injustices from Germany is understandable.
However, questions of standing and state succession must be re-
solved before such a claim can be lodged.
II. STANDING AND SUCCESSION OF STATES
A. Standing
With the exception of post-World War II developments ac-
cording rights to the individual under international law,1 28 ju-
rists have long deemed states to be the sole actors in interna-
tional affairs. Historically, as long as acts of domestic repression
124. Cabinet Looks at Ways of Reactivating Economy, NAMIBIAN, August 1, 1991, at
3.
125. See generally Fiona Adams, Wolfganag Werner, and Peter Vale, The Land Is-
sue in Namibia: An Inquiry (Namibia Institute for Social and Economic Research 1990).
126. Marja-Liisa Kiljunen, The White Man's Burden: Africans Under Apartheid, in
NAMIBIA: THE LAST COLONY 105-09 (Reginald Green, Maria-Liisa Kiljunen, & Kimmo
Kiljunen eds. 1981).
127. Robert Rotberg, Namibia: An African Success Story - So Far, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, July 29, 1992. Indeed, there should have been an aid package tailored to
the country's needs from the appropriate U.N. development agencies as the reward for
playing by the rules of the international transition game. Ideally, the receipt of that aid
package would have been contingent upon the new government's continued adherence
both to internationally-accepted standards of human rights and particularly, those
human rights guarantees enshrined in the country's new democratic constitution.
128. These developments are described in Berat, supra note 4.
[Vol. 5:165
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/6
NAMIBIA vs. GERMANY?
did not interfere with international relations, the issue of eve-
ning the score by aggrieved individuals or groups was, by and
large, not a subject that concerned the international community.
The issue was settled domestically with acts of retribution by
competing contestants for power who vied for personal loyalty.
It was only with the eradication of state absolutism as expressed
in Louis XIV's statement "L'etat, c'est moi,"'1 29 and the emer-
gence of the impersonal modern state that governments and citi-
zens began to become accountable to universal legal codes. Even
then, however, the concept of state sovereignty, long at the
center of traditional international law, continued to elevate state
dominion over people and territory. Such a dispensation left lit-
tle recourse to aggrieved individuals or groups either inside or
outside the state.130
Instead, in the international sphere, the sole international
responsibility for state activity acknowledged by this traditional
international law was state responsibility for the breach of one
state's rights-contractual, territorial, or delictual-by another
state. Indeed, beginning in the eighteenth century, international
law dealt only with the laws governing sovereign states.131 Re-
jecting natural law concepts whereby human beings were at the
center of international law, this unenlightened international ju-
risprudence flew in the face of contemporaneous Enlightenment
notions and practices of individualism that began to find expres-
sion primarily in England, the United States, and France. Inter-
national law was, therefore, unable to deal with the many vexing
questions resulting from state actions against individuals and
groups including state-sanctioned torture against individuals-
what are now termed crimes against humanity-and a host of
other evils such as arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, and
disappearances.
It was only after the Nazi and Japanese excesses of World
War II that international human rights law arose in response to
state persecution of individuals and groups. While proving of lit-
129. DULAURE, HISTORY OF PARIS, 387 (1863).
130. Jurist M.N. Shaw has written, "[t]he principal subjects of international law are
nation-states, not individual citizens." M.N. SHAW, INT'L L. 1 (2d ed. 1986).
131. According to jurist Ian Brownlie, "[t]he sovereignty and equality of states re-
present the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations... IAN BRaoWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (3d ed. 1979).
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tle utility to those still under repressive systems, once those sys-
tems are finally dismantled, appeals to such universal human
rights norms and international institutions offer those who have
been wronged some hope of vindication and compensation
should they decide to proceed against their former oppressors.
Even then, the potential for optimal results deriving from such
an appeal is minimized by the fact that the dominant actors in
the world community continue to be nation-states which jeal-
ously guard their sovereignty and territorial integrity and abhor
interference in their perceived domestic jurisdiction. Under this
"traditional" international law, therefore, it is uncontroverted
that the Namibian government has standing to bring suit
against Germany in international fora such as the International
Court of Justice, or to take up the case of its citizens in arenas
such as the United Nations or via bilateral negotiations. 13 2 How-
ever, with regard to the question of liability for acts committed
against the Namibian people, the historical nature of such a
claim, however, raises substantial problems of state succession
that demand resolution before the Namibian government can
proceed to seek redress.
B. The Succession of States
1. General Principles
The problem of succession of states is "the legal conse-
quences of a change of sovereignty over territory."' 33 Such a
change may occur through cession, annexation, the formation of
a union or federation, or the attainment of independence. In all
instances, one sovereign is replaced by another with regard to
the territory in question. Accordingly, state succession influences
rights and obligations regarding treaties, private rights, and pub-
lic administration. 3 4 In order to determine whether state succes-
sion has occurred, the interested party must understand, as ju-
rist J.H.W. Verzijl put it, the "fundamental difference between
132. In this regard, see also HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-96
(1966).
133. MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 157
(1982).
134. The history of the law of state succession is found in JH.W. VERZIJL, VII IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1974).
[Vol. 5:165
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/6
NAMIBIA vs. GERMANY?
cases in which one or more new states really succeed to an old
one, and those in which a state only appears to be new, but de-
spite the modifications in size, its system of government, or its
constitutional or social structure, is in actual fact identical in the
eyes of international law with its former self."'1 5 In the latter
instance, there is legal continuity for purposes of international
law and no state succession has occurred.
Whether state succession has occurred is a crucial issue be-
cause it is generally accepted that successor states inherit no re-
sponsibility for international delicts or crimes committed by the
predecessor state. s The only two exceptions are if the successor
state benefits from the acts of the predecessor state or if it acts
in concert with the predecessor in committing the delict.3 7
These principles were articulated in two seminal cases. In the
Robert R. Brown Claim, 38 Robert Brown, a United States citi-
zen had, in 1895, made substantial preparations for the pro-
jected opening of a public gold digging at Witfontein in the
South African Republic."3 " He had placed many agents on the
land and arranged for the transmission to them by heliograph of
notice of the actual grant of licenses. Until that notice from the
responsible clerk arrived, claims could not be staked.
As Brown's methods were unorthodox, the relevant authori-
ties initially refused to grant the licenses and then rescinded the
proclamation opening the field. Brown brought an action in the
Republic's courts and was granted twelve hundred licenses.
135. Id. at 16.
136. The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility of
1978, 1978 2 INT'L L. CoMM. Y.B. 78, provides that a breach of an international obligation
is an "internationally wrongful act" (art. 19(1)) entailing the international responsibility
of the breaching state (art. 1). An internationally wrongful act can be either an interna-
tional delict or an international crime. An international delict is "any internationally
wrongful act which is not an international crime." Id. at art. 19(4). An international
crime is a breach of an international obligation "so essential for the protection of funda-
mental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime
by that community as a whole." Id. at art. 19(2).
137. D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNIcIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
480-83 (1967).
138. (1923) 6 R.I.A.A. 120.
139. The South African Republic was an Afrikaner republic that eventually became
incorporated into the Union of South Africa. Its history and legislation are described in
Lynn Berat, Constitutionalism and Mineral Law in the Struggle for a New South Af-
rica: The South African War Revisited, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNT'L L.J. 61 (1991).
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However, the executive and the judiciary became embroiled in a
power struggle and, after the Chief Justice was dismissed, the
judgment in Brown's favor was dismissed. Consequently, Brown
petitioned Queen Victoria as sovereign of the Republic for in-
tercession, but he was directed to take up his claim with the
United States government.
In 1901, Great Britain annexed the Republic and Brown pe-
titioned the British Governor of the Transvaal, as the Republic
had become known, for redress. It was only in 1923 that the An-
glo-American Arbitral Tribunal considered the case. 140 The Tri-
bunal dismissed the claim because it could not support the prin-
ciple that the "doctrine [that] a State acquiring a territory by
conquest without any undertaking to assume such liabilities is
bound to take affirmative steps to right the wrongs done by the
former State."14 Two years after Brown, the same Anglo-Ameri-
can Arbitral Tribunal heard the Hawaiian Claims.141 In that
case, Britain presented claims against the United States regard-
ing wrongful imprisonment, detention in prison, and forced de-
partures from the country, and other indignities which were in-
flicted upon British subjects by Hawaiian authorities when
Hawaii was a republic and not yet annexed by the United
States. The Tribunal held that the claims had to be rejected be-
cause the annexation extinguished the legal unit responsible for
the wrongs in question and legal liability was extinguished with
it.
Following the logic of these two cases, the fact that Ger-
many lost part of its territory following World War I-in this
case that colonial part in which the acts complained of oc-
curred-should not extinguish a claim against Germany if no
state succession occurred in Germany itself.
140. The Tribunal was established under a Special Agreement of August 18, 1919
(211 C.T.S. 408).
141. (1923) 6 R.I.A.A. 120. The Tribunal also noted that the authority Britain had
enjoyed over the Republic as sovereign "fell far short of what would be required to make
[Great Britain] responsible for the wrong." Id.
142. (1925) 6 R.I.A.A. 157.
[Vol. 5:165
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/6
NAMIBIA vs. GERMANY?
2. Germany
In 1871, the North-German Federation and the South Ger-
man States joined to form the German Reich14 3 which gave way
to the Weimar Republic in 1918. The Republic was a weak state
plagued by hyperinflation and high unemployment. Indeed, the
dire economic conditions were, at least, partly responsible for
the rise of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich in 1934. However, unlike
the 1871 creation of the Reich which was a state succession, the
later developments were examples of regime change.,
4
The defeat of the Third Reich in World War II, the Allied
Occupation, and the subsequent creation of two Germanys-the
Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) in the west and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) in the east-complicates
matters. If it is determined that the German Reich incurred lia-
bility for the acts it committed in Namibia, it must be decided
whether the F.R.G., G.D.R., or both were successor states.
The position in the F.R.G. was that it was "not the succes-
sor of, but rather identical with, the still existing organless Ger-
man Reich."14 This theory was derived from F.R.G. Basic
Law 61 4 and supported by court decisions to the effect that al-
though the German state existed after 1945, it had no capacity
to act. Accordingly, the F.R.G. accepted no liability for debts in-
curred by the Reich.1 47 Moreover, as the F.R.G. merely coexisted
143. WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON, THE GERMAN EMPIRE 1867-1914 AND THE UNITY
MOVEMENT (1966). In the literature, the Reich is also referred to as the Second Reich or
the German Empire.
144. The best discussion of the succession question for this period is found in
VERZIJL, supra note 134.
145. Geck, Germany and Contemporary International Law, 9 TEx. INT'L L.J. 263,
265-66 (1974).
146. FRG Basic Law, Preamble, arts. 16, 23, 116, 146.
147. This argument is discussed in greater detail in VERZIJL, supra note 134, at 267-
68. The 1951 ruling by the Federal Supreme Court in the Collision of the Baltic stopped
short of determining whether the F.R.G. was liable for a claim brought against the Reich.
I.L.R. 1951, Case No. 15 (Oct. 30, 1951). Instead, the case, which involved a claim of set-
off by the owner of a neutral ship against a claim by the F.R.G. for collision with a
German ship during the war. The Court found that "the German Reich is to be regarded
as a legal entity even after the establishment of the Federal Republic" although the
F.R.G. owned all assets of the Reich situated in the Western occupation zone. Id. at 41.
The court went on to acknowledge "the doctrine of identity, which stresses the identity
of the German Reich and the [Federal Republic as if] there has been no change in the
entities in whom the claims are vested." Id. at 42. With regard to set-offs, the Court
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with the German state, it was not a successor state. The courts
of other western states also accepted the F.R.G. view that it was
not the Reich's successor state. For example, to the Swiss, the
creation of the F.R.G. and G.D.R. did not mean that the Reich's
international obligations were terminated. Hence, in 1952, the
Court determined that a 1905 treaty between Switzerland and
Germany continued to exist between Switzerland and the
F.R.G." a Six years later, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands
found that the F.R.G. was "the continuation under international
law of the former German Reich.""'
Complicating the question of state succession was a 1972
treaty between the two Germanies in which they recognized each
other as sovereign states. 150 However, in 1973, the F.R.G.'s Fed-
eral Constitutional Court, responding to a challenge to the valid-
ity of the treaty, insisted that the two Germanys shared the
same roof formed by the still existing Reich.' 5' Hence, the two
were not foreign states and neither East nor West could re-
present all of Germany. The Court went on to uphold the treaty
which it viewed as merely giving de facto recognition to the
G.D.R. and which explicitly reserved the national question. The
views of the F.R.G. and its supporters contrasted markedly with
the G.D.R. position that the old German state met its end with
the 1945 termination of hostilities and that it as a successor
state was not responsible for any acts of the Reich. That view
apparently became discredited in 1990. Indeed, it seems that the
continued, "it would be contrary to good faith if a creditor of the Reich who, before [the
War's end] was entitled to claim a right of set-off, were to be deprived of that right by
reason of the collapse of the Reich, while the latter would be in no way precluded from
asserting its claims against its debtors." Id.
148. I.L.R. 1952, No. 14.
149. 26 I.L.R. 477 (1958-I1). The opinion was contrary to a 1949 lower court decision
to the effect that a state succession had taken place because the Reich no longer existed
and had been replaced by two distinct sovereign entities. Flesche Case, A.D. 1949, No. 87
at 267-68. Both Verzijl and the jurist Hans Kelsen supported this view. VERZIJL, supra
note 134, at 277; HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 386 (1966). In the
United States, the Second Circuit agreed with the view that the Reich and the F.R.G.
were not the same and that the F.R.G. was a successor state. Kunstammlungen zu Wei-
mar v. Elicofon, 536 F.Supp. 829, 853-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.
1982).
150. Federal Republic of Germany-Germany Democratic Republic Recognition
Treaty, 1972.
151. F.R.G. Constitutional Court.
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notion of "reunification" ascribed to the process by which the
two Germanys came together lends credence to the West Ger-
man idea that, although divided, the German state continued to
exist in the post-World War II years with two governments exer-
cising jurisdiction over different parts of the country. This
means that there has been no German state succession since
1871. By this logic, the reunification merely represented the res-
toration of the complete sovereignty of the continuously existing
German state. While Germany, therefore, can be held liable for
the acts committed early in this century, it may be that South
Africa and Namibia also can be held accountable.
3. South Africa
Following the reasoning regarding state succession articu-
lated above, South Africa, which administered the mandate on
behalf of the British Empire, would not be liable. The territory
did not, under international law, ever become part of South Af-
rica although a serious argument can be made that South Africa
can be held liable on other grounds, namely the imposition of
apartheid, a crime against humanity. s52  Germany could, of
course, argue that South Africa's behavior in Namibia amounted
to a de facto state succession and that South Africa was en-
riched by German behavior because South Africa had fewer un-
ruly Africans to subdue; therefore, the cost of administering the
area was less, so South Africa gained an economic benefit en-
tirely keeping with its apartheid policies.15 3 By this logic, South
152. See infra text accompanying note 155.
153. It is extremely unlikely that Germany would make the latter claim in an inter-
national forum. In 1964, the case of Pittacos v. Belgium, 45 I.L.R. 24 (1964), came before
the Belgian Court of Appeals. Pittacos had owned a plantation in the Belgian Congo
which had become infested with a contagious plant disease. The Belgian colonial authori-
ties in the Belgian Congo had ordered that the plantation be destroyed to prevent the
spread of the contagion. The colonial courts found the official policy to be improper and
unnecessary. Once the Congo became independent Zaire, Pittacos brought suit against
Belgium in the Belgian courts. Pittacos argued that quasi-delictual debts incurred before
a state is dismembered continue to be the responsibility of the dismembered state,
namely Belgium. The Court of Appeals agreed that Pittacos had accurately stated the
governing equitable principle but, based on the facts of the case, it rejected his argu-
ment. Moreover, the Court found that the general policy of destroying diseased property
benefitted the colony even if the actions were improper in the Pittacos case. As the whole
colony had been benefitted by the policy and the actions had been for a proper motive,
liability could not be made to lie with Belgium. Following the logic of Pittacos, in the
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Africa would be liable because it benefited from Germany's con-
duct." However, it is unlikely that perverse benefits which fly
in the face of international norms would shift liability to South
Africa. 155 Thus, South Africa cannot be held responsible for acts
committed under German rule. This does not necessarily mean
that the new Namibian government is not liable. Although the
standing issue is resolved in Namibia's favor,1 56 the question of
Namibian responsibility remains to be answered.
Namibia case, the equitable principle that delictual liability remains with the dismem-
bered state would make Germany rather than the successor states of South Africa or
Namibia liable. Since it would be perverse for Germany to argue that the policy of geno-
cide benefitted the colony, that it was engaged in for a proper motive, and that, there-
fore, the benefitted successor state should be liable, the liability should remain with
Germany.
154. In the Lighthouse Arbitration (France v. Greece), (1934) P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No.
62, the parties had, by special agreement, referred the question whether a concession for
the maintenance of lighthouses agreed between the Ottoman Government and the
French firm of Collas and Michel in April 1913 was "operative as regards the Greek
Government in so far as concerns lighthouses situated in territories assigned to it after
the Balkan Wars or subsequently." The P.C.I.J. held that because negotiations for the
concessions had begun before the war, it was evident that there had been no intention of
excluding the territories which were by 1913 occupied by Turkey's adversaries. In the
Lighthouses in Crete and Samos Case, (France v. Greece) (1937) P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No.
71, the Court dealt with the applicability of its judgment to lighthouses in Crete and
Samos which were autonomous areas in 1913. It found that Turkish sovereignty contin-
ued over Samos and Crete until it was formally renounced in treaties after the end of
World War I. In 1956, a French-Greek arbitral tribunal held that the issue of succession
to delict must be decided by reference to all the facts and that no general principle
existed. According to the tribunal, Greece, the successor state, was liable for acts by
Crete, the predecessor state, which violated the rights of the French company. This was
so because a Greek company was responsible for the violation in question and its actions
occurred with the full knowledge of the Greek government which, after becoming succes-
sor to the Cretan government, maintained the wrongful situation. O'CONNELL, supra note
138, at 483. However, that same year, in the Aghios Nicolaos Case, the same tribunal
found that the Greek government was not liable when it was not involved in the compli-
cated relationship among the government of Crete, the Ottoman government, and the
same French company. The tribunal queried the logic of permitting both parts of a dis-
membered state to escape international obligations to provide compensation which
would have lain with the predecessor state responsible for the wrongful act. Id.
155. Namibia, of course, could proceed against South Africa for having practiced
apartheid and racial discrimination in the country. Such behavior contravenes the jus
cogens and is punishable under international law. On this subject, see BERAT, supra note
1, at 146-54. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
156. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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4. Namibia
As indicated above, once Germany lost World War I, Ger-
man South West Africa became a Class C mandate under the
League of Nations system and the Union of South Africa, now
the Republic of South Africa, administered the mandated terri-
tory on behalf of the British Empire. 15 7 Although this transfer of
power ended German sovereignty over the area, it did not mean
that sovereignty was vested in the League of Nations. The
League was an international organization with certain interna-
tional rights and duties. Its nature was, however, sui generis in
the international law of the day. It possessed none of the attrib-
utes of statehood, namely a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations
with other states. 158 Accordingly, sovereignty over Namibia did
not vest in the League which, instead, had supervisory power
over mandates.
Sovereignty over South West Africa also did not vest in
South Africa despite the expressed intention of South Africa to
the contrary. From the start, South Africa treated the mandate
as a veiled annexation. It continually took actions that asserted
South African sovereignty over the territory. The Permanent
Mandates Commission repeatedly rejected any act or suggestion
that a mandatory had sovereignty over a mandated territory.
For example, when the preamble to a 1926 Portuguese-South
African treaty delimiting the boundary between South West Af-
rica and Angola provided that "the Government of the Union of
South Africa, subject to the terms of the said mandate, possesses
sovereignty over the territory of South West Africa lately under
the sovereignty of Germany,' 159 the Commission objected. In a
report to the League Council it indicated that
[u]nder the circumstances, the Commission doubts whether such
157. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
158. The generally accepted criteria for statehood appear in article 1 of the Monte-
video Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. It provided that "the state
as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a perma-
nent population; (b) a defined territory: (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other states." Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 164 L.N.T.S. 19.
159. T.S. No. 29; 123 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 590.
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an expression as 'possesses sovereignty,' used in the preamble to
the above-mentioned Agreement, even when limited by such a
phrase as that used in the above-quoted passage, can be held to
define correctly, having regard to the terms of the Covenant, the
relations existing between the mandatory power and the territory
placed under its mandate."' °
Subsequently, in 1927 and 1930, the Council passed resolutions
stipulating that mandatory powers did not have sovereignty over
their mandates.
It would seem, then, that by default, sovereignty over South
West Africa vested in the people themselves. This was not the
case. In international practice, League of Nations mandates and
later, in the early post-World War II years, trust territories
under the United Nations, were dependent territories and in
terms of succession of states, they received the same treatment
as colonies. Accordingly, they had no sovereignty before inde-
pendence. Sovereignty over South West Africa, therefore, re-
mained in suspension. This view was expressed by Lord McNair
in his separate opinion in the International Court of Justice's
1950 advisory opinion on the legal status of the territory. 161 He
wrote that "sovereignty over a Mandated Territory is in abey-
ance; if and when the inhabitants of the territory obtain recogni-
tion as an independent state, as has already happened in the
case of some of the Mandates, sovereignty will revive and vest in
the new state."1 62 Following this view, it would appear that, in
1990, the new Namibia, which came into being via the U.N.-con-
trolled elections process, began its life as a new state, a tabula
rasa in international relations. Although the new state's govern-
ment has legitimate internationally-recognized authority to re-
present the Namibian people,6 " Namibia cannot be held liable
160. Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission 182 (1926), Doc. C. 632 M. 248.
161. International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 150.
162. Id. at 150.
163. However, it is more appropriate to argue that because of its peculiar interna-
tional legal status prior to independence, the Council for Namibia must be deemed to be
the predecessor state for some purposes, namely membership in certain international
organizations. This proposition and the issues of the obligations of the new government
with regard to treaties and private rights are elaborated upon in Lynn Berat, Namibia:
The Road to Independence and the Problem of Succession of States, 18 J. POL. Sci. 33,
48-55 (1990).
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for atrocities committed during the days of German rule.
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that because the pre-
sent German state may be seen as a direct legal continuation of
the old Germany instead of the creation of a new sovereign en-
tity, it, rather than South Africa and Namibia, should be ac-
countable for acts which took place in Namibia earlier in this
century. This being the case,1'6 the most likely complaint is for
genocide. However, if the Namibian government alleges geno-
cide, the problem of retroactivity then arises because there is a
question as to whether the acts committed at that time, which
are now violative of international law, were also illegal then.
III. GENOCIDE: A CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE QUESTION OF
RETROACTIVITY
A. Genocide
In pursuing its claim, the Namibian government must first
decide upon the grounds on which it can proceed against Ger-
many. Based on the historical evidence, it seems that a case can
be made that the Germans engaged in genocide, a term first
used by the scholar Lemkin in 1944.165 The relevant interna-
tional instrument is the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Genocide, which was adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in December 1948 and entered into force just over two
years later in January 1951.166 According to article 2,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or reli-
gious group, such as (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Caus-
ing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Im-
posing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."'
Article 1 provides that genocide, "whether committed in time of
164. However, the argument can also be made that, regardless of whether modern
Germany is the same state as the Reich or a new one, there are no sound juridical rea-
sons as to why it should escape liability for the acts of its predecessor.
165. LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (1944).
166. 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
167. Id. at art. 2.
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peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which
[the contracting parties] undertake to prevent and punish." 168
Article 6 establishes that genocide can be prosecuted in "a com-
petent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction. .. 169 Moreover, the contracting parties are obliged
to enact legislation making genocide a crime within their territo-
ries and to provide "effective penalties for persons guilty of ge-
nocide" or of associated acts; 170 such acts include conspiracy, di-
rect and public incitement, attempt and complicity. 17 1 Those
punishable for genocide and associated acts include "constitu-
tionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individu-
als. '17 1 The Convention also declares that the commission of ge-
nocide violates the jus cogens.7 Certainly, the available
evidence on German treatment of the Herero and Nama/Orlam
fulfills the criteria for genocide. There was intent to destroy the
groups by killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and
inflicting conditions calculated to bring about its physical
destruction. 174
The Genocide Convention, of course, did not exist at the
time of German rule of South West Africa. However, the mere
existence of the Convention does not mean that before its pas-
sage genocide was not a crime under international customary
law.
The exact parameters of customary international law,
namely those practices widely adhered to by the international
community, are still subject to scholarly debate. Jurist Louis
Henkin has suggested that it is
widely accepted that it is now a violation of international law for
any state to practice or condone genocide, slavery or slave trade,
killing or causing the disappearance of persons, torture, prolonged
arbitrary detention, comprehensive and systematic racial discrim-
ination, and perhaps other consistent patterns of gross violations
168. Id. at art. 1.
169. Id. at art. 6.
170. Id. at art. 5.
171. Id. at art. 3.
172. Id. at art. 4.
173. Peremptory norms. On the jus cogens, see infra text accompanying note 175.
174. See supra notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text.
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of internationally recognized rights. 75
According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, a state violates international law if, as
a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones ge-
nocide.1 76 Moreover, the commission of genocide would not only
leave Namibia with a cause of action but also give rise to univer-
sal jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction permits any state to prosecute offend-
ers for certain crimes even though the prosecuting nation lacks a
traditional nexus with either the crime, the alleged offender, or
the victim. Courts developed this doctrine centuries ago to deal
with piracy then menacing international trade and justified its
application by deeming the pirate hostis humani generis, the
enemy of all people. 7 7 Later, the doctrine expanded to enable
all states to prosecute slave traders and war criminals. Today,
drawing on multinational conventions that outlaw specific
crimes, such as the Genocide Convention, and on fundamental
norms that have developed in international criminal law, legal
scholar Kenneth Randall maintains that universal jurisdiction
has expanded further to allow any state to prosecute those
charged with hijacking, terrorism, torture, apartheid, genocide,
and other offenses that the international community widely con-
demns.17 As these offenses endanger values to which the global
community is committed, the legal force of any state's challenge
to the prosecution by another state of universal crimes is thus
diminished.179 Although in the current international climate pre-
sumably no other state would be willing to bring an action
against Germany, there is some indication that the whole ques-
tion of genocide may be obviated by the recognition, in 1990, by
175. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 21 (1990).
176. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987),
sec. 702 (customary international law of human rights), reprinted in FRANK NEWMAN &
DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 332 (1990). The Restatement also
deems violative of international law: slavery or slave trade; the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment; systematic social discrimination; and a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights. Id.
177. Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 783, 788-792 (1988).
178. Id. at 785.
179. Id.
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three German political parties - the Christian Democratic
Union, the Social Democratic Party, and the Green Party - that
genocide in fact occurred. 8 '
B. The Problem of Retroactivity
While the commission of genocide is today clearly an inter-
national crime, the question remains whether customary inter-
national law proscribed genocide even at the beginning of this
century, thus making Germany's conduct actionable or whether
the prohibition was a post-World War II development. In order
to make a claim of genocide, the Namibian government must
first resolve this problem of retroactivity, namely whether the
acts committed constituted breaches of customary international
law at the time they occurred. Indeed, the retroactivity issue was
widely debated during and in the years immediately after the
Nuremberg trials.
The Nuremberg Tribunal came into existence via an August
1945 agreement among the victors of World War 11.181 The
Agreement provided for the establishment "after consultation
with the control council for Germany, [of] an international mili-
tary tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have
no particular geographical location.' 1 82 The Charter of the Tri-
bunal, which was annexed to the Agreement, gave a definition of
crimes against humanity as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhu-
mane acts committed against any civilian population before or
during the war, or persecution on political, racial, or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in violation of any
domestic laws of the country where perpetrated. 188
The Tribunal's jurisdiction was based on German violation of
various treaties, particularly the Kellogg-Briand Pact.18 4 The
180. NAMIBIAN, November 5, 1990. Presumably, before Namibia could get satisfac-
tion for its claim, the opinion of these political parties would have to become the domi-
nant view within the German government.
181. United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.
182. 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
183. Charter of the Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, art. 6C.
184. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; 22 A.J.I.L.
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Tribunal construed its own jurisdiction narrowly and thus in-
sisted that its power did not extend to "crimes against human-
ity" unless such crimes occurred "in execution of, or in connec-
tion with" war.18 5 Although Count Three of the Nuremberg
indictment charged the defendants with war crimes and Count
Four charged them with the commission of crimes against hu-
manity, the Tribunal, in line with its narrow interpretation of its
authority, refused to convict the defendants for such crimes
committed prior to the beginning of World War 11.186 It did,
however, find them guilty of crimes committed during the war
over the objection of the defendants who argued that their be-
havior was not criminal under any law at the time they acted.
Thus, although the Tribunal refused, for narrow jurisdictional
reasons, to make the crimes in question retroactive for the pe-
riod before the War, it did permit retroactivity for the War
years. According to the Tribunal, "so far from it being unjust to
punish.. , it would be unjust if... wrongs were allowed to go
unpunished. 1 87 The mere fact that the Tribunal Charter ac-
knowledged crimes against humanity and that individuals were
convicted despite the absence of any international agreement to
which Germany had been party, gives further credence to the
idea that the prohibition on the proscribed conduct derived
from natural law rather than positive law.
The Nuremberg notion that retroactivity was essential for
justice to be served was not new. As the common law developed
in England, heinous acts such as murder were retroactively
made into crimes. Indeed, such behavior had been punished for
centuries and an accused could not seek exoneration on the
grounds that when he committed the act, no statute or other law
made them illegal. 188 It was this logic that the Nuremberg Tri-
Suppl. 109, 114.
185. Trial of the Major German War Criminals (Cmd. 6964); The Charter and Judg-
ment of the Nuremburg Tribunal: History and Analysis, U.N. Doc. 1949 Vol. 7.
186. In response to this narrow constructionism, in 1948, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on Genocide. See supra notes 166-
175 and accompanying text.
187. International Military Tribunal Secretariat, Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, November 14, 1945 - October 1,
1946, 42 vols. (1947-49), quoted in A. D'ENTREvES, NATURAL LAW 110 (1951). The judg-
ment is also discussed in CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (1980).
188. BASSIOUNI, supra note 186.
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bunal adhered to in delivering its judgment. It was this same
logic that the Israeli Supreme Court applied in its 1962 condem-
nation of Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann. 18e In that case, the Court
relied upon Blackstone's Commentaries and distinguished be-
tween ex post facto laws and retroactive laws. It followed Black-
stone's notion that
ex post facto laws are objectionable when, after an action indiffer-
ent in itself is committed, the legislator then, for the first time,
declares it to have been a crime and inflicts a punishment upon
the person who has committed it .... Here it is impossible that
the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done
would afterwards be convicted to guilt by subsequent law. He
had, therefore, no cause to abstain from it and all punishment for
not abstaining must, in consequence, be cruel and unjust.19
The Court distinguished such ex post facto treatment from ret-
roactivity in which case no new crime was created. Thus, the
Court held that
[t]he crimes created by the Law and of which the appellant was
convicted must be deemed today to have always borne the stamp
of international crimes, banned by international law and entailing
individual criminal liability. 9'
Moreover, the Court continued,
[A]s is well known, the rules of the law of nations are not derived
solely from international treaties and organized international us-
age. In the absence of a supreme legislative authority and interna-
tional codes, the process of its evolution resembles that of the
common law; . . . its rules are established from case to case, by
analogy with the rules embodied in treaties and in international
custom, on the bases of the 'general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations,' and in the light of the vital international
needs that impel an immediate solution. A principle which consti-
tutes a common denominator for the judicial systems of numer-
ous countries must clearly be regarded as a 'general [principle] of
189. Atty. Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 277 (Sup. Ct. Israel 1962).
190. Id.
191. The court deemed these crimes to have such opprobrium that they gave rise to
universal jurisdiction. According to the Court, "It is the particular universal character of
these crimes that vest in each State the power to try and punish any who assisted in
their commission."Atty. Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 277 (Sup. Ct. of Israel 1962).
On universal jurisdiction, see supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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law recognized by civilized nations. .. 192
According to the logic of the Israeli court, genocide always
constituted an international crime. Indeed, this seems to have
been recognized by the Germans themselves as when the Chan-
cellor lobbied the Kaiser to rescind von Trotha's order on the
grounds that it violated "all Christian and human principles"
and demeaned Germany's "standing among the civilized nations
of the world."' 93 Thus, the German actions against the Herero
and Nama/Orlam would be examples of international crimes.
IV. REPARATIONS: THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Having established that Germany can indeed be held liable
for genocide, the nature of that liability must then be deter-
mined. Unlike at Nuremberg or in the Eichmann trial, those re-
sponsible for atrocities in Namibia are no longer alive. Thus, in-
dividual liability is impossible. Instead, reparations are the
appropriate means of making amends for past wrongs. In 1928,
in the Chorzow Factory Case between Germany and Poland in-
volving German factories taken over by the Polish Government,
the Permanent Court of International Justice'9 " established that
"it is a principle of international law, and even a general concep-
tion of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obli-
gation to make reparation.' 9 5 Such reparation
192. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 277.
193. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
194. The Permanent Court of International Justice was the first World Court. It was
established pursuant to article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Cove-
nant was Part I of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany of June 28, 1919 (225 C.T.S.
188) and of the Peace Treaty of St.Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919 with Austria
(226 C.T.S. 8) and the Treaty of Neuilly of November 27, 1919 with Bulgaria (226 C.T.S.
332). A committee of jurists appointed by the League Council drafted a statute approved
by the League Assembly on December 13, 1920. League of Nations, Records of the First
Assembly, Plenary Meeting 500; P.C.I.J. (ser. D) Ann. 3, at 3. The Court, which was the
predecessor of the International Court of Justice, first convened on February 15, 1922
and ceased to exist when the judges resigned on January 31, 1946. The accomplishments
of the Permanent Court are described in HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942 (1943).
195. 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17. The Court held by a nine to three margin that
Poland had an obligation to pay as reparation to the German government, not only the
value of the undertakings expropriated at the time of the acquisition, but also a compen-
sation equivalent to the damage sustained by the owners. The compensation was to be in
the form of a lump sum payment; its calculation was to be made by experts appointed by
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must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the ille-
gal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Res-
titution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum cor-
responding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear;
the award if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would
not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it -
such are the principles which should serve to determine the
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international
law.1 96
The reparation is governed by the rules of international, rather
than domestic, law. "The damage suffered by an individual is
never therefore identical in kind with that which will be suffered
by a State; it can only afford a convenient scale for the calcula-
tion of the reparation due to the State.'
'1 97
At the end of World War II, the statute of the newly-estab-
lished International Court of Justice acknowledged three kinds
of reparations. 198 These are restitution, indemnity, and satisfac-
tion. Theoretically, restitution or restitutio in integrum9 is the
primary form of reparation; it supercedes indemnity, pecuniary
reparation for determinable damage including consequential
damages, and satisfaction, compensation for non-material or
moral injury to the dignity of the state generally taking the form
of prosecution of guilty parties or symbolic moves like official
apologies. In practice, however, restitutio is rarely used as ag-
grieved individuals and their governments generally favor mone-
the President of the Court. Experts were so appointed, P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 16, at 11,
but, after a settlement of the dispute by agreement of the parties, another Presidential
order terminated the investigation and an Order of the Court ended the proceedings.
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 18/19.
196. 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47.
197. Id. at 28. Moreover, because at the level of international law, reparation is
made to the state and not to the individual whose claim it espouses, the recipient state
has total control of any sum it receives and can dispose of it as it sees fit. Administrative
Decision No. V (1924) 7 R.I.A.A. 119.
198. Article 7 of the U.N. Charter established the International Court of Justice as
one of the principal U.N. organs and article 92 made it the main judicial organ. Article
92 also provided that the Court is to function in accordance with its statute which is
annexed to the Charter and indicates that it is based on the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the Charter.
199. The return of property unlawfully taken, the revocation of an illegal act, or the
prospective abstention from a repetition of such conduct.
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tary compensation.200
Perhaps the most well-known instance of a claim for repara-
tions, and the one which furnished the most valuable precedent
for Namibia, involved the post-World War II claims brought by
Israel against Germany for atrocities committed by the Nazis
against European Jews. Israel demanded the return of all confis-
cated property that had been owned by Jews; indemnification
for survivors who had suffered damage and injury; and repara-
tions for the rehabilitation of the displaced.0 1 The West Ger-
man government began discussion with Israeli representatives at
the Hague in March 1952. At that time, based on an estimated
current cost, not the cost that would have been incurred at war-
time prices, of U.S. $3,000 per person to resettle five hundred
thousand Jewish immigrants to Israel, the Israeli government
sought U.S. $1,500,000,000.202 On September 10, 1952, the two
sides agreed upon $715 million in services, commodities, and
machinery to assist the Israelis in their resettlement task from
1953 to 1966.201 The agreement came into force on March 27,
1953,204 and, because the reparations were really to the commu-
nity as a whole and not just to the survivors, it extended long
beyond the actual period necessary for resettlement. Following
German conduct in the Israeli reparations case, it would seem
that Namibia's best hope is to seek to extract a similar agree-
ment with regard to the Nama and Herero. The best course of
conduct would be to pursue the claim via diplomatic channels. If
negotiations fail, then the Namibian government might pursue
its claim in international fora such as the United Nations. Such
behavior would enable Namibia to mobilize support in the inter-
national community which could be brought to bear on Ger-
many. Namibia also could ask the International Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion or bring a claim against Germany in that
forum. However, either action involving the I.C.J. might take
years to resolve.205 The Namibian government, faced as it is with
200. On this subject, see VERZIJL, supra note 134, at VI 742-45 (1973).
201. R. HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 1155 (1985).
202. F. Honig, The Reparations Agreement Between Israel and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 43 AM. J. INT'L. L. 564, 565 (1954).
203. Id. at 566.
204. Id.
205. There are many jurisdictional hurdles that Namibia would have to overcome if
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daunting social and economic problems, should endeavor to set-
tle this matter favorably as soon as possible so that the suffering
of its people can be ameliorated.
CONCLUSION
When Namibia became independent in 1990, the country's
successful transition to democracy marked the end of decades of
foreign domination. Few of the Namibian people, however, could
forget the colonial experience whose legacies continue to plague
them. Indeed, a particularly sordid part of the Namibian past
was the country's late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century rule by Germany. During that time, thousands perished
through the German overlords' policies. Today, a strong case can
be made that under international law Germany is liable for ge-
nocide committed in Namibia against the Herero and Nama/
Orlam. The appropriate measure of redress is reparation for the
injuries suffered. The best way of pursuing such a claim is
through diplomatic channels and, if that approach fails, in inter-
national fora. Of course, reparations can never adequately serve
as compensation for the atrocities which took place.20 6 Neverthe-
less, if used prudently by the Namibian government, such repa-
rations would at least help restore Namibia's social and eco-
nomic fabric which was so tragically torn nearly a century ago.
a case on the merits were to be heard by the I.C.J. Some of these hurdles, which are
beyond the scope of this article, are discussed in BERAT, supra note 1, at 183-84 (discuss-
ing compulsory jurisdiction).
206. When Israel began negotiating its reparations agreement with West Germany,
both parties understood that, from Israel's point of view, no reparation would ever be
adequate compensation for the actions of the Nazis. Honig, supra note 202, at 565.
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